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Moral hazard, engendered by the safety net of government-pro-
vided deposit insurance, tends to increase the probability and cost of
bank failures. Uninsured depositors, by far the largest group of bank
creditors, can bring market discipline to banks that should reduce their
propensity to take excessive risks. However, three important objections
to reliance on depositors for this purpose have been raised: (1) unin-
sured depositors may be unable to monitor banks or to do so in a timely
fashion; (2) even if they could evaluate bank performance, the additional
interest rate they could charge would be insufficient to affect bank
behavior materially; and (3) in any event, uninsured depositors are
likely to withdraw their funds rapidly (run) rather than monitor banks,
thereby causing cosily disruptions to other banks and the economy.
Each of these objections is evaluated here, including a review of relevant
empirical studies. The conclusion of this analysis is that the objections to
allowing uninsured depositors to serve as market disciplinarians are not
valid.
Several means of limiting deposit insurance coverage are described
next. These include coinsurance, limited insurance, and depositor
preference. The coinsurance proposal would increase monitoring by
depositors, but would also increase the probability of runs. Limiting
insurance to transactions accounts has some merit, but also some
important shortcomings. Depositor preference reduces the risk faced by
uninsured depositors and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
but the effect may be offset by weak banks ￿ollateralizing nondeposit debt.
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This paper concludes that the objections to uninsured depositors
serving as effective monitors of banks’ risk-taking activities are not valid;
still, banking supervisors and legislators are likely to bail out uninsured
depositors, in large banks particularly. Hence, alternative sources of
market discipline are considered. Subordinated debt has properties that
make its holders excellent monitors and restrainers of bank risk. Equity
capital holders also have incentives to monitor bank performance, but
they gain from risk-taking when their bank’s capital is low. Higher
required capital that includes subordinated debt fully as meeting this
requirement, together with structured early intervention and resolution,
are seen as the preferable means of imposing market discipline on banks.
Moral Hazard and the Need for Market Discipline
Moral hazard refers to the adverse incentive engendered by a
guarantee or contract that does not account for all contingencies, or by
a safety net that fully or partially compensates people for some out-
comes. The adverse incentive is that people take actions or risks that
they would not otherwise have taken, had they expected to bear the full
cost as well as the benefit from their actions.
Debtors to limited liability firms are subject to the moral hazard that
equity holders will act differently than they promised, once the debt
holders have committed their resources to the firm. In particular, equity
holders might assume greater risks and remove assets from the firm that
the debt holders could attach. In effect, corporate equity holders have an
option that they can put to the debt holders if losses from risky firm
activities exceed the assets remaining in the firm (Black and Scholes 1973).
As agency theory emphasizes (see, for example, Jensen and Meck-
ling 1976), the cost of the put option is borne by the equity holders rather
than by the debt holders, since the debt holders can either withhold
their funds or charge a price for their funds that includes the expected
cost to them of the option. Alternatively, equity holders can offer debt
holders assurances that the put option will not be exercised. These
assurances include covenants that restrict equity holders’ opportunities
to increase risk (such as limitations on new investments), collateral that
reduces the debt holders’ cost of default as well as equity holders’
incentives to default, and monitoring of equity holders’ activities (such
as periodic presentation of financial statements audited by respected
independent public accountants).~ Debt obligations also might include a
put option that the debtors could exercise.
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Deposit Insurance and Moral Hazard
Deposit insurance removes the need to be concerned about moral
hazard from depositors whose funds are fully protected. Hence, they
have no reason to monitor the activities of banks, nor do banks have to
pay these depositors a premium that reflects the risks the banks might
take with the depositors’ funds. Rather, the risks are shifted to a
government-sponsored and backed deposit insurance agency, the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). This situation would not
present a problem if it could be assumed that the FDIC had the same
incentives and ability as private debt holders do in dealing with bankers’
moral hazard incentives to take greater risks. However, such an as-
sumption must be questioned, for two important reasons.
First, government officials have incentives to overrestrain banks,
because the officials do not get the full benefit of risks that bankers take
but are criticized for the bankers’ failures. Customers and bankers who
lose when banks fail might blame the officials, but those who are well
served are not likely to praise them. Bankers who are conservative,
though, tend to praise officials for "reining in" their more adventurous
brethren, particularly when these often more imaginative bankers take
away some of the conservative bankers’ customers.
Second, government officials have incentives to put off dosing
down banks that are in danger of failing. As Kane (1988, 1992, and
elsewhere) has pointed out, these officials can maximize their own
welfare by permitting insolvent or weak banks to continue operations in
the hope that the banks’ fortunes will improve. Or, at the least, the
banks’ closings will be put off until after the officials have moved on to
other opportunities. This forbearance is particularly desirable for bank
regulators when a troubled bank is large, because many people might be
hurt should it be closed. An exception to this expectation occurs with a
change in regime. Then the new regulators tend to "clean out" the
mistakes of those they displace.2
Government officials also fear runs on other banks, even though
detrimental effects on the money supply and runs on solvent banks
almost certainly can be offset and contained by Federal Reserve open
market operations. For the officials, "almost certainly" is not good
enough, as they bear the immediate cost of the runs (should these occur)
and get few benefits from other banks’ more prudent operations to
avoid future runs.
Hence, government officials are unlikely to operate as would
private debt holders whose personal fortunes (or those of their employ-
2 The initial forbearance by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the zealous
deanup by its successors, the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Resolution Trust
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ers) are at stake. The question is whether depositors and other bank debt
holders are likely to act in the same manner as would holders of
nonbank corporate debt.
Market Discipline by Uninsured Depositors
The general argument in favor of using uninsured depositors to
impose market discipline on banks is fairly straightforward. These debt
holders are expected to act like the holders of the debt of other
corporations, which is not government-insured. As described above,
they are subject to moral hazard costs imposed by equity holders, and
should act accordingly.3 The major difference between banks and
nondepository corporations is that demand deposits, most banks’ major
liability, are redeemable on demand. Although this situation can result
in rapid withdrawals (runs), which might give rise to externalities (as
discussed below), it is also seen as a benefit for reducing the costs of
moral hazard. As Flannery (1994) points out, banks can change the risk
structure of their assets very rapidly, thereby changing the conditions
under which they obtained funds from debt holders. Banks’ offer of
liabilities repayable on demand is an effective means for assuring these
debt holders that the banks will not change their risk structure.
Alternatively, if banks did assume more risk, the debt holders could
readily demand higher compensatory rates of interest. Calomiris and
Kahn (1991) similarly suggest that liabilities that can be withdrawn on
demand restrain bankers with low ratios of equity to assets from
engaging in inefficient actions, such as taking on high-risk, negative
present value projects or withdrawing funds in the form of high
dividends and salaries. Such bankers must be concerned that depositors
will run if they have reason to fear that their bank might become
insolvent. Hence, deposits that can be withdrawn on demand, or on
short notice, serve as a means of restraining bankers and assuring
depositors that bankers will not take advantage of them.
Those who believe that uninsured depositors cannot be relied on to
monitor and restrain excessive risk-taking by deposit-insured banks,
and that they should not be used for this purpose, emphasize three
concerns: (1) uninsured depositors are unlikely to be able to monitor
banks or to do so in a timely fashion; (2) even if they could evaluate bank
performance, the additional interest that uninsured depositors might
charge would be insufficient to affect bank behavior meaningfully; and
(3), in any event, uninsured depositors are likely to withdraw their
3 See Benston and others (1986, Chapter 7), and Macey and Garrett (1988) for
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funds rapidly (run) rather than monitor banks.4 Each of these concerns
is analyzed in the following sections.
Ability to Assess Risk in a Timely Fashion
Randall (1990, p. 65) argues that "[m]arket analysts, whether they
represent bank stock investors or creditors, have relatively little to go on
in forming a judgment on the potential for major losses in a bank’s loan
portfolio." Consequently, they cannot monitor bank performance in a
timely fashion. Even if a run by uninsured depositors were desirable as
a means of disciplining bankers, Randall would argue (and Garten 1986
emphasizes) that it would come too late to affect bankers’ behavior.
Randall supports his conclusion with a careful study of 87 New
4 Several recent articles appearing in The Yale Journal on Regulation (Garten 1986; Macey
and Garrett 1988; Garten 1988; and Mantripragada 1992) discuss the case for and against
depositor discipline in some detail. Because the best expression of the case against relying
on depositor discipline of which I am aware is given by Randall (1990), the sub-section of
my paper on bank runs relies importantly on his article.
Garten (1986) bases her doubts about the usefulness of depositors to constrain bank
risk-taking on the three reasons given above. Her long article (54 pages and 209 footnotes)
is well summarized in her reply to a comment by Macey and Garrett (1988):
First, since a significant portion of uninsured deposits are maintained for reasons
that have little to do with the risk and return associated with investments in
particular banks, the majority of even uninsured depositors will not continuously
monitor bank risk. Second, the structure of the deposit market provides strong
incentives for all depositors to rely on the liquidity of their deposits, rather than
analysis of bank disclosure, to protect themselves against risk. Third, for the same
reasons, depositors as a group are unlikely to develop effective contractual
mechanisms that will limit the inclination of bank management to take excessive
risks. Finally, empirical studies of depositor behavior not only have failed to
demonstrate that depositors will exert effective market discipline, but cannot
explain why market discipline is not already working to constrain bank risk-
taking (Garten 1988, pp. 241-242).
Her proposal for improving the situation is discussed later in the present paper.
Macey and Garrett (1988) criticize her 1986 article, emphasizing the ex ante effect of
possible depositor withdrawals on banks’ propensity to take risks. In only 25 pages and
108 footnotes, they point out that it is not necessary that all depositors assess risks--
marginal depositors are sufficient. In a reply of but 11 pages and 42 footnotes, Garten
(1988) restates her original position and disputes (correctly, I believe) Macey and Garrett’s
suggestion that depositors could protect themselves by obtaining contractual guarantees
from banks to limit their risk-taking and banks could similarly protect themselves from
depositor runs by contractually limiting depositors’ right to withdraw funds. However,
she pays little heed to their valid points about ex ante effects and the role of marginal
depositors.
Mantripragada (1992) reviews the well-known defects of the federal deposit insurance
system, restates Garten’s concerns, and suggests that depositor discipline could be made
effective if the policy were "to set insurance coverage limits in terms of the maturity of the
deposits rather than to set dollar limits for coverage of all types of deposits. Under such a
policy, deposit insurance will essentially be extended to all short-term or transactions
deposits .... Deposits of longer maturities are actually financial investments and the
government should not insure those investments... "(p. 571, emphasis in original). This
proposal is considered below.70 George J. Benston
England commercial and savings banks that failed in the period from
1989 through 1992. In this study (Randall 1993), he examines the
portfolios of the failed mature and new commercial and savings banks
and compares them with banks that did not fail. He finds that "[c]om-
mercial real estate loans were the dominant factor in recent New
England bank failures" (p. 14), particularly loans for construction and
development.
Randall examines these banks’ investments in commercial real
estate loans for years before and after their nonperforming real estate
loans exceeded I percent of total assets, which he defines as the "normal
level." From this analysis, he concludes: "When nonperforming loans
began to exceed normal levels, most banks had already ceased making
commercial real estate loans and commercial and industrial loans or, if
not, they pulled back at the first sign of credit problems" (p. 15). He
finds that "[s]ubstantially all of the loans that caused the failures of the
87 banks in the study were on the books before the credit problems
began to appear. No evidence was found of efforts to ’grow out’ of
lending problems" (p. 16). Furthermore, he states that "when credit
problems first appeared, bankers either were already shrinking loan
portfolios, both in total and in troublesome categories, or quickly began
to do so" (p. 19).
This evidence supports Randall’s previously expressed conclusion
that "a sudden deterioration in such indicators [nonperforming loans,
provisions for bad debts, and charge-offs] has little predictive value
since it is seldom clear whether it is the result of a housecleaning, or the
tip of an iceberg .... [Rather,] the best evidence of a potential credit
problem is a rapid growth in a particular loan category with high
inherent risk characteristics" (1990, p. 65). This leads Randall to con-
clude:
While greater emphasis on this type of analysis should help in timely
evaluation of risk, standardized data pertinent to concentrations are limited.
It is usually only in the later stages of risk-taking that the sophisticated
market can dearly distinguish irresponsible overconcentrations from reason-
able specialization. The typical depositor, and even the large depositor with
analytical resources, has little potential for making timely judgments on bank
risk-taking in loan portfolios.
Additional evidence, seems to support this conclusion. Randall
(1989) examines stock price movements, stock analysts’ warnings, and
bond rating changes for 40 large bank holding companies from 1980
through mid 1987, in the years before they revealed serious credit
problems, About one-half of the cases were Southwestern banks that
suffered losses when oil prices declined; most of the rest suffered
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unable to detect the problems before they were revealed by the banks’
disclosures of high levels of nonperforming loans and loan loss provi-
sions.
Simons and Cross (1991) examine the stock prices of 22 New
England banks that were downgraded by examiners to a 4 or 5 CAMEL
rating between 1981 and 1987.s They compute cumulative stock-return
residuals from the market model over the 52 weeks prior to the bank
examination. Although the cumulative residuals are consistently nega-
tive in the aggregate and for 12 of the banks, the aggregate is not
significantly different from zero and the cumulative residuals are con-
sistently positive for 10 banks. A similar pattern is found for a control
sample of 15 bank holding companies. Thus, they (like Randall) con-
clude that there is "no reason to believe that the prices of bank holding
company stocks can be monitored [by uninsured depositors, among
others] to improve the supervision of commercial banks" (p. 55).
However, several earlier studies (Pettway 1980; Pettway and Sinkey
1980; Shick and Sherman 1980) find that unexpectedly low stock price
returns provide early warnings of serious bank problems. Gilbert (1990)
reviews seven additional studies of bank equity share prices (see his
Table 3, reproduced as an Appendix to this paper) from which he
concludes (p. 17): "The only useful information from the empirical
studies is that investors in bank stocks, who have the strongest
incentives to be sensitive to the risk assumed by banks, are able to
differentiate among banks on the basis of risk."
The distinction between the two groups of studies appears to be the
severe and apparently unexpected decline in real estate values and oil
prices experienced by the New England and Southwestern banks in the
1980s, as opposed to the bank-specific operating problems and general
credit problems experienced by the banks in the 1970s. In his detailed
examination of New England bank failures, Randall (1993, p. 15) reports:
"Available evidence suggests that most decisions to discontinue lending
were initiated by bank management rather than the supervisory author-
ities." Thus, the credit problems that resulted in the New England
banks’ severe problems in the 1980s appear to have been unexpected by
both the bankers and their supervisors. As noted by Gilbert (1990, p. 16),
a similar situation occurred with the Southwestern banks: "We cannot
expect the participants in the market for bank stocks to have greater
foresight in predicting the decline in the price of oil than the participants
in the market for oil."
5 Banks are rated by supervisors on five factors: Capital, Asset quality, Management,
Earnings, and Liquidity, giving rise to the acronym CAMEL. Each individual component,
as well as a composite rating of all five factors, is assigned a score from 1 (strong) to 5
(likely to fail).72 George J. Benston
Furthermore, stockholders benefit when banks take risks (Benston
1984). Investments in risky real estate loans offer high returns as well as
high losses. Indeed, considering that the FDIC takes up losses that
exceed equity, stockholders (who can diversify their investments)
should prefer banks with low levels of equity to take risks that offer even
negative expected present values. Hence, Simon and Cross’s (1991)
finding that the stock prices of New England banks that took high credit
losses did not decline until these losses were recognized should not be
interpreted to mean that investors were not aware of the risks.
Some analysts (for example, Merton and Bodie 1993) also argue that
it is difficult for depositors to assess the riskiness of banks’ assets
because such assets are inherently opaque. The essence of banking, they
point out, is making loans to firms and people who cannot communicate
clearly and publicly the risk of their enterprises (Diamond 1984). How,
then, could depositors assess this risk? Four responses answer this
question. First, banks disclose a considerable amount of information
about their financial condition, such as call reports that include nonper-
forming loans and earnings statements that include loan loss provisions.
Second, several private financial reporting services make comparisons
among banks, giving details of their financial structures. Third, banks
are examined in detail by federal agencies. The examiners’ reports (or
summaries thereof) could be made public.6
Finally, compare the information made available by banks with the
information about most other corporations. The financial statements of
other corporations often exclude important intangible assets (such as
research and development, patents, advertising, and customer good-
will) and include fixed assets and inventories valued at cost numbers
that diverge considerably from market values. Furthermore, unlike
banks, few other corporations are directly comparable to each other.
These corporations’ financial statements are much more difficult to
interpret than are those presented by banks. Yet, nonbank corporations
regularly issue debt that is not guaranteed by the government.
The risk of uninsured lending to banks, however, is often greater
than the risk of lending to nonbank corporations. Banks presently hold
much lower ratios of equity capital to assets than do other corporations.
Uninsured bank creditors thus have a much smaller equity cushion on
which to rely. Hence, they must be concerned with decreases in asset
values to a greater extent than holders of nonbank corporate debt, who
usually must be concerned only that the corporations have sufficient net
cash flow to pay the debt as promised.
6 See Garten (1986, pp. 141--47) for additional discussion and citations to supporting
publications. Jordan (1993), President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, strongly
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Garten (1986), though, bases her conclusion--that noninsured
depositors cannot effectively assess the risk to which their funds are
subject--on the depositors’ difficulty in determining the amount of loss
they might take, should their banks fail. This problem is exacerbated,
she says, by the uncertainty of predicting which banks the regulators
will dose. She proposes that banks’ assets be stated at market values
and that the regulators adopt a clear rule as to which banks they will
close and the extent to which losses will be imposed on uninsured
depositors. The structured early intervention and resolution procedure
developed by Benston and Kaufman (1988) and essentially adopted in
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA) could provide such assurance, in large part because (if it were
implemented) it is unlikely that a bank will fail with losses imposed on
depositors.
Therefore, I conclude that depositors could assess the risks taken by
their banks. At the least, they could make such assessments as effec-
tively as can creditors generally.
Are Interest Charges Insufficient to Affect Bank Behavior?
In his comprehensive article, "Market Discipline of Bank Risk:
Theory and Evidence," Gilbert (1990, p. 4) points out: "Proposals for the
reform of deposit insurance that rely on market discipline assume that
market participants can differentiate among banks on the basis of risk,
and that market yields on bank debt reflect that risk." He reviews six
studies on the market for uninsured deposits and six studies on the
market for subordinated debt.7 He reports (p. 16):
The findings about the relationship between risk and interest rates on
uninsured deposits and on subordinated de~bt are more mixed. Three of the
six studies of bank CD rates report no evidence that higher CD rates are paid
by banks that assume more risk. Four of the six studies of the determinants
of rates on thesubordinated debt of banks find no significant effects of risk
measures on interest rates.
In addition to the studies reviewed by Gilbert, four other papers analyze
the risk premia on large certificates of deposit (CDs). Cargill (1989),
Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990), Keeley (1990), and Ellis and Flannery
(1992) find that the interest rates on these largely uninsured deposits
reflect the risk of the banks that issued them. Furthermore, Cook and
Spellman (1991) find that the CD rates paid by savings and loan
7 Gilbert (1990), Table 3, reproduced as an Appendix to this paper. Nine studies on the
market for bank equity also are reviewed.74 George J. Benston
associations responded to the market’s perception of the insolvency of
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC).
Considering the reasonable assumption by uninsured depositors
during the period examined in the studies that the FDIC was very likely
to bail them out by arranging for the assumption of all deposits held by
an insolvent bank, it is surprising that these studies find any relation-
ship between risk and the interest rate paid to largely uninsured
depositors. As Gilbert (1990, p. 16) notes, most of the banks studied are
large banks that, for most of the periods studied, were considered to be
"too-big-to-fail"--that is, too large for the losses to be imposed on their
depositors.
Garten (1986, p. 134) raises an additional issue: "in order for market
discipline to be effective, depositors must view their accounts as
investments, in which case risk and return are the primary consider-
ations in choosing a bank." She concludes (p. 134):
[F]or most depositors, a deposit account is less an investment than a product
purchased for reasons that have little to do with either risk or return. These
"involuntary depositors" . . . may be large uninsured depositors who use
their accounts for other investment purposes . . . [I]nvestor-depositors are
concentrated in the large national banks, making market discipline a possi-
bility only for this relatively small group of institutions [footnotes omitted].
Although many (perhaps most) depositors may keep their funds in
particular banks because these banks offer them services and conve-
nience, it is difficult to accept her assertion that depositors have no or
little regard for the possibility that their funds might be at risk of
nonrepayment. If depositors (or any creditors) really believed that their
funds were at risk, it is implausible that they would not demand
rewards (for example, higher interest rates or "free" services) that reflect
that risk, or assurances that their funds were not at risk.8
Hence, I find little merit in the assertion that uninsured depositors
and other bank creditors could not, or would not, charge banks an
interest rate that reflected the risk to which they were exposed. In
addition, there is no reason to believe that banks would differ from other
firms, in that they also would take the charge imposed by uninsured
creditors into account in determining the level of risk that they would
assume.
See Macey and Garrett (1988) for a more extensive discussion and critique of
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Runs by Uninsured Depositors
Demand depositors can almost immediately remove their funds
from a bank they fear might have insufficient assets to repay their
balances. The direct cost to uninsured depositors of withdrawals is very
small, as demand depositors with accounts over $100,000 usually have
accounts in several banks and can transfer funds among these accounts.
However, these depositors also tend to have borrowing and other
financial relationships with their depositories. Hence, they bear the cost
of disrupting and possibly severing these relationships, should they
mistakenly run when their bank actually is solvent.
Time depositors and holders of certificates of deposit (CDs) cannot
remove their funds until the maturity dates without incurring a penalty
charge. However, banks almost never prevent time and savings depos-
itors from withdrawing their funds, for fear of starting a run by demand
depositors. Most banks that issue large (over $100,000) CDs must roll
them over almost continuously. Hence, banks can experience a slow
run, should investors be unwilling to renew or newly purchase CDs that
replace those that mature.
Randall (1990) expresses well the concern about runs, particularly
on large banks. He says (pp. 67-68) that a run that causes "the isolated
closure and liquidation of a single very large bank with well-known
problems at a time when the domestic and international banking
systems are in unquestioned good health . . . [would result in a con-
siderable transitory disruption] with limited systemic effects and no
prolonged negative impact from a macroeconomic point of view.’’9 This
is serious, he states, particularly if it were to be "taken as a precedent
and result in instability at a later time when several large banks were in
trouble." The major policy issue, however, "would involve several large
banks in danger of failing at about the same time, including some money
center banks and perhaps a few major foreign banks."
Because paraphrases cannot do justice to his specific and well-
expressed concerns, I quote his explanations of them in their entirety
(p. 68-69). My brief responses to the issues he raises follow each of his
paragraphs.
Problems would likely stem from the impact of some economic event on
several banks, and banks could be adversely affected by more than one
economic event because of a coincidence in timing. There would likely be a
9 The Federal Reserve could use open market operations to offset a reduction in base
money that would occur should depositors run to currency or redeposit funds in banks
with reserve ratios that are higher than those of the original banks. The "health’--good or
bad--of the domestic and international banking systems is irrelevant for the purpose of
avoiding a negative macroeconomic impact.76 George 1. Bens~on
high degree of public uncertainty as to the depth of the underlying economic
problems and the timing of recoveries. Most uninsured depositors and other
bank creditors would be concerned about the possible failure of particular
banks, and would be prone to hasty reaction to rumors and misinterpretation
of information. Adverse developments in one bank could cause instability in
other banks perceived to have similar problems.
The situation described is based on several important assumptions.
One is that banks have insufficient capital to absorb expected losses. A
related assumption is that banks are insufficiently diversified, such that
the negative effect of the economic event alluded to would render banks
insolvent. However, if depositors believed that their funds were at risk,
it is likely that most, if not all, banks would increase their capital or
diversify their risks and take steps to assure their customers that their
funds were safe, similar to the actions taken by nonbank corporations.
Supervisors would face similar uncertainties, even though they had
much more information on the weaknesses of specific banks. While the
depositor need only decide that the situation warrants pulling funds from
one bank and putting them into another, the supervisor must determine if a
particular bank is likely to fail, quantify the degree of any potential insol-
vency, and devise and execute a strategy for resolving the institution. A
careful evaluation of the credit exposure of a troubled major bank involves a
significant portion of the available examiner resources, and evaluations must
be updated frequently as conditions change. When a number of large banks
are in trouble at once, the supervisors will not necessarily be in a position to
know the viability of a particular major bank when a deposit run develops. In
a chaotic situation where depositors are rapidly shifting deposits from bank
to bank, and creditors of banking concerns are refusing to roll over notes, the
authorities must decide whether to seize particular institutions or support
them, in some cases without a current evaluation.
In addition to the assumptions given above, Randall is assuming
that the supervisors do not employ a system of automatic intervention
when a bank’s capital declines below prespecified levels, as is now
required by FDICIA. With structured early intervention and resolution,
it is doubtful that bank examiners and supervisors would have the
heavy caseload described. Furthermore, FDICIA also established a
continuous, on-site regulatory presence for large (over $10 billion in
assets) institutions. This means that, at least for this group of banks, a
"current evaluation" will always be available.
The consequences of seizing an institution that is damaged, but still
viable, are fairly serious, so the temptation will be to support banks in
questionable condition until a reassessment can be made. Such support may
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This problem should be mitigated, but will not be eliminated, by prompt
resolution techniques.
I agree with the final sentence, except that I would have said,
"almost entirely mitigated." With structured early intervention and
resolution, a seriously weak institution would not be permitted to
continue operations without increasing its capital. Even without it, the
actuality, as well as the possibility, of runs would force the supervisory
authorities to take action expeditiously, even though they might prefer
to wait and hope that conditions would improve, as Randall suggests. In
addition, FDICIA restricts discount window borrowing to undercapital-
ized institutions.
In the payments area, sudden runs on a number of major institutions
could place great pressure on banks and the Federal Reserve System to limit
daylight and overnight exposure to other banks and customers. It is not hard
to visualize scenarios in which the payments system would cease to function
efficiently for an extended period while multiple runs on large banks
continued. This could produce a snowballing of defaults and delinquencies,
and lead to failures of weak firms and disruption of business generally. The
effect could be to depress economic activity for a number of months.
Numerous borrowers would abruptly be forced to try to find other
lenders as their usual banks experienced major deposit runs and were forced
to suspend lending activities. Defaults could occur on bank and bank holding
company debt as well as that of other firms, leading to a flight to quality and
likely disruption in various markets. Some funds could flow to foreign banks
in search of safety, disrupting normal intermediation patterns even where the
funds continued to be denominated in dollars.
The disasters Randall sketches are possible, perhaps even plausible,
if one assumes, as he does, that banks would not structure themselves
to avoid runs. I believe not only that they would do so, if they believed
it were necessary, but also that they would differentiate themselves from
banks that were not prudently structured and operated, so that they
would not be subjected to misinformed runs. Then, the specter of
simultaneous runs raised by Randall would be unlikely to occur. He
goes on to say."
The contagion of uncertainty could cause runs on any major foreign
banks that were believed to be in difficulty, further adding to the general
confusion. Bank supervisory, deposit insurance, and discount ,window
personnel could become overwhelmed by the combination of failures of
nonviable banks and liquidity crises in viable banks. This could result in
delays and misjudgments that increased the costs to the insurance fund, the
banking industry and the public, and prolonged the period of disruption.78 George J. Benston
Structured early intervention and resolution would work to keep
supervisory personnel from being overwhelmed by failures. Indeed,
very few failures would occur, as banks would have strong incentives to
raise additional capital or merge with strong banks or even liquidate,
rather than become progressively weaker until the bank supervisors
took over or uninsured depositors decided to withdraw their funds
rather than risk taking losses.
It is probably true that, even in a chaotic situation such as that described
above, the total volume of deposits of the banking system would not be
substantially reduced by direct conversion to currency or foreign-denomi-
nated balances. The amount of funds available for loans, however, could be
substantially reduced. As deposits run from weak banks to stronger banks,
the banks receiving the sudden influx of deposits cannot be expected to
increase loans quickly, taking on customers squeezed out of other banks.
Much of the influx would be considered temporary funds and invested
accordingly. Capital adequacy considerations and the time necessary for
information gathering, credit analysis, and loan approval would also limit
the ability of healthy banks to absorb the lending activity of the weak and
failing banks. Thus, a period of significantly reduced bank lending would
result, with negative implications for the level of economic activity.
The failure of a bank does, indeed, disrupt its borrowers’ economic
situation, particularly for those borrowers who use only one bank. But
the failure of any large company is disruptive to its customers and to its
employees and their dependents. As is the situation for companies
generally, customers and employees are likely to consider the possibility
that a firm might not survive when deciding whether and how to
establish and maintain a relationship with it. Unlike many nonbanks,
though, banking products (for example, loans) have close substitutes
offered by other banks and by nonbanks (although difficulty in trans-
ferring credit information might cause temporary dislocations). Thus,
the failure of a bank, even a large one, is likely to be less disruptive than
the failure of many other companies. Banks are special in that they are
not very special.
The banking system is central to the payments mechanism and the
provision of short-term credit, and also affects the financial markets and the
transmission of Federal Reserve open market operations. The discussion
above suggests that the level of disruption to the banking system and bank
customers and creditors that could result from a crisis of confidence in the
major banks could significantly depress the level of economic activity. It
could also increase the losses to be absorbed by the banks, increasing the risk
that the banking system itself could be overwhelmed and unable to support
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Banks are indeed central to the payments mechanism. But many
ways can be found to protect the payments system without protecting
individual banks from runs. First, banks could limit their exposure with
bilateral credit limits and net debit caps. They also might be required to
hold capital or collateral sufficient to cover net uncleared funds. Or,
participants could (and do) protect themselves much as they do when
dealing with their other customers and correspondents or respondents,
by refusing to extend credit to banks that are undercapitalized. Second,
the legal obligations of all participants in the payments system can be
clearly specified, in order to reduce the cost of litigation. Third,
participants in the system could agree to guarantee the obligations of a
defaulting institution, with each assuming a pro rata share of its
settlement obligation. These procedures are employed by CHIPS, the
multilateral payment netting and settlement system operated by the
New York Clearing House Association. Federal Reserve charges for
overdrafts give participants further incentives to reduce the amount of
uncleared funds outstanding. Or, the Federal Reserve System could
permit only transfers against funds known to be in place.10
Banks are not central, however, to the transmission of Federal
Reserve open market operations. These need not be conducted directly
through banks; about one-half of the security dealers the Fed trades with
are not banks. Lack of public confidence in major banks would not affect
the efficiency with which open market operations could be conducted or
cause a financial or economic crisis.
Finally, there is little evidence that bank runs have been contagious,
causing the failure of solvent banks. Kaufman (1994) reviews studies of
the effect on other banks of the failures of six large banks in the United
States between 1973 and 1988, three bank failures in Hong Kong
between 1982 and 1985, two bank failures in Canada in 1985, and the
unexpected announcement of suspended debt repayments by Mexico,
Brazil, and other Latin American countries in 1982, 1983, and 1987.
These studies found no failures of similar banks and little evidence of
deposit outflows. Most of the studies examined the stock prices of other
banks to determine whether the failure or lesser problems of a large
bank affected the economic value of similar banks. Kaufman (1994, p.
141) reports that "[w]ith only rare exceptions, these studies report
strong evidence that contagion of share returns occurred only for banks
in the same market or product area as the initially affected bank.
Investors successfully differentiated among banks. Strong shocks to one
10 See Gilbert (1989) for a description of payments system risk, the Federal Reserve’s
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bank or group of banks did not spill over to other banks randomly or to
all banks.’’11
Dwyer and Gilbert (1989) review the evidence on bank runs and the
methods adopted by banks to cope with them in the period before
enactment of deposit insurance. After analyzing a considerable amount
of data on banking panics between 1857 and 1933, they state (p. 55):
In sum, two things seem to be clear from these data. First, some holders
of bank liabilities did bear significant losses during periods with runs. These
losses were not necessarily caused by the runs themselves .... Second,
before the creation of the Federal Reserve, depositors’ loss rates from failed
banks were declining over time.
They conclude (p. 60):
While several runs on the banking system took place before the forma-
tion of the Federal Reserve System in 1914, banks took actions that limited
their effects. By issuing clearinghouse loan certificates that other banks
accepted to clear checks, banks operated temporarily with relatively low
reserve ratios. In the more severe runs, bankers jointly restricted payments
but continued operating. Moreover, even prior to the creation of the federal
safety net in the United States, runs on the banking system were infrequent.
The banking system can operate for many years without runs on the banking
system, even in recessions.
Although I believe that Randall overstates the seriousness and
frequency of the problems that might result from the failure of large
banks, many of his concerns are plausible, given two important assump-
tions. One is that banks have such a low level of capital for absorbing
losses that uninsured depositors have reason to believe that their funds
would be in danger if they did not withdraw them immediately. The
second is that the situation described does not consider bankers’
behavior if they had reason to fear runs by depositors.
Both of these related assumptions describe the present situation,
where uninsured depositors (and their bankers) have reason to believe
that they are not at risk. As long as banks are considered to be "too-big-
to-fail" (or, rather, too big to have their costs inflicted on uninsured
depositors), the scenario painted by Randall might best be described as
a self-created crisis, where the regulators believe they must intervene
u Further, although Garten (!986, footnote 9, p. 130) states: "Even now, few--if
any--depositors count on the protection afforded by federal intervention to prevent bank
failure, as is vividly demonstrated by the frequency of bank runs," I could find only one
citation to a bank run in her paper. She reports that depositors ran on a New York City
Chinatown bank "following rumors that a bank officer had been identified at an organized
crime hearing as the ’godfather’ of Chinatown’s underworld" (p. 137, and footnote 32,
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because they have established a situation where banks, rationally, have
not taken actions that would make such intervention generally unnec-
essary. Furthermore, with structured early intervention and resolution
implemented as suggested by Benston and Kaufman (1988) and outlined
below, it is unlikely that the authorities would have to intervene to
prevent uninsured depositors from having to take losses.
Limiting Deposit Insurance Coverage: Coinsurance,
Limited Insurance, and Depositor Pr-eference
This section will consider briefly some proposed and enacted
methods of limiting the claims of depositors and other creditors to the
deposit insurance fund.
Coinsurance
Coinsurance is an often-used means by which insurers reduce
moral hazard costs that might be imposed by insurees. Two forms may
be distinguished. One, modeled on the system used in the United
Kingdom, would pay depositors a fraction of their deposits, perhaps up
to some limit. In the United Kingdom, depositors may receive 75 percent
of their deposit balances up to £20,000, or a maximum of £15,000
(approximately $22,000). The second, suggested by the American Bank-
ers Association (1990), would impose an automatic "haircut," or reduc-
tion in the amount of the uninsured deposit balance, equal to the
average loss incurred when a bank failed (approximately 10 percent).
Randall (1990, p. 69) points out that partially insured depositors still
would have incentives to withdraw their funds before their bank was
declared insolvent, thereby saving them the coinsurance amount that
otherwise would be lost. Thus, if runs are a concern, these proposals
would be less acceptable, as they would put all deposits at risk and
hence give all depositors incentives to run.
Limited Insurance
Deposit insurance might be limited to short-term deposits, which
would be fully insured (Furlong 1984; Mantripragada 1992). Thus,
depositors who could run would have no incentive to do so. Deposits
that could not be withdrawn before some specified time period, pre-
sumably at least through the period between bank examinations plus
some additional time for the authorities to act (in all, perhaps two years),
would be entirely uninsured. In effect, time deposits (including CDs)
that could not be repaid before the authorities had time to close an
insolvent or unsafely managed bank would serve to absorb losses, much82 George J. Benston
as capital and subordinated debt absorb them. Furthermore, holders of
such deposits would have strong incentives to monitor banks’ activities
and to demand assurances that banks would not take excessive risks or
change their risk profiles or would pay compensatory interest rates.
Four possible problems with this proposal should be mentioned.
First, the status of deposits with remaining maturities of less than
approximately two years is not clear. These deposits might be insured to
prevent slow runs. In this event, however, banks would have consid-
erable incentive to offer only time deposits with maturities of less than
two years. As a result, many banks would subject themselves to interest-
rate risk, since they would shorten the duration of their liabilities.
Second, banks would probably collateralize many, if not most, of
their uninsured time deposits. While this of itself is not an undesirable
move, it would serve to obviate the role of uninsured time depositors in
bringing market discipline to bear on banks’ activities. It also would shift
a considerable amount of banks’ assets from loans to Treasury and other
market instruments.
Third, banks would have to be prevented from directly or indirectly
repaying uninsured time-dated deposits in advance. If this were not
done, the goal of preventing runs would not be met. However, if the
possibility and actuality of runs were considered to be desirable (as is
suggested above), there is an advantage in allowing banks to redeem
time-dated deposits early at a discount (as they now do). If banks
refused such redemptions, they would be signaling the supervisory
authorities that they were suffering financial difficulties.12
Fourth, even though time-dated deposits were said to be unin-
sured, it is likely that holders of these deposits would seek protection if
their banks failed with losses imposed on the depositors. The depositors
probably would claim that they did not realize that these bank deposits,
unlike demand deposits and time deposits with maturities of less than
two years, were not insured. As is noted below, it would be difficult for
legislators and the banking authorities to deny such claims, particularly
if the uninsured time-dated deposits were in amounts of less than $100,000.
Depositor Preference
The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 includes a provi-
sion that gives preference to depositors and the FDIC over other
creditors in the event that a bank is insolvent. This presumably was
enacted as a means of reducing the costs to the FDIC. The cost savings
would be reduced, however, if banks gave the nonpreferred creditors
12 This might be considered a form of WaiFs (1989) "puttable subordinated debt"
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(or they demanded) effective 100 percent insurance by collateralizing
their debt. The assets used as collateral thus would no longer be
available to the FDIC. Uninsured depositors also would no longer
benefit from the collateralized assets, but they would gain by obtaining
a preference over noncollateralized, nondeposit creditors.
The consequences of federal depositor preference can be inferred
from the experience of thrifts in the 23 states with depositor preference
laws (as of December 31, 1987). Hirschhorn and Zervos (1990, p. 119)
find that thrifts "adopting depositor preference would increase the
average proportion of total (both secured and unsecured) nondepositor
claims that are collateralized from 47 percent to 60 percent. This would
represent a collateralization of 25 percent of currently unsecured non-
depositor claims." Furthermore, they find that "the effect is significantly
larger for institufions that are more likely to fail. Thrifts with negative
net worth would collateralize 99 percent of unsecured nondepositor
claims, and thrifts with net worth between 0 and 3 percent would
collateralize 54 percent of such claims" (pp. 119-120). They also find that
interest rates on partially insured large CDs would decrease by 6 to 14
basis points for solvent thrifts, and by 8 to 18 basis points for insolvent
thrifts, the amounts increasing with the maturities of the CDs (p. 122).
It should be noted that banks could raise funds by selling assets
rather than by engaging in collateralized borrowing. The result would be
a similar loss to the FDIC and uninsured depositors of these banks’ best
assets. Indeed, banks with low capital-asset ratios would be better
advised to reduce their assets rather than borrow. It also should be
noted that thrifts probably used collateralized borrowing because a
major source of their funds has been advances from Federal Home Loan
Banks, which make only collateralized loans.
Consequently, depositor preference should make little difference in
the amounts absorbed by the FDIC when banks fail, with one exception.
It should be more difficult for bank creditors who are not explicitly
identified as depositors to make claims on the deposit insurance fund.
Conclusions with Respect to Uninsured Depositors
I find that the objections to uninsured depositors serving as
effective monitors of banks’ risk-taking activities are not generally valid.
First, uninsured depositors can assess credit risk at least as well as can
creditors of nondepository corporations. Indeed, there is reason to
believe that the risks taken by banks are easier to estimate than are the
risks taken by other corporations. (However, given the present low level
of banks’ equity capital, uninsured lenders to banks have little scope for
measurement errors.) Although the evidence suggests that the large
losses absorbed by banks that loaned to commercial real estate devel-84 George J. Benston
opers and oil producers were not predicted by the stock market, it
appears that these losses were also not predicted by bank managers or
by the regulatory authorities.
Second, evidence shows that holders of de jure partially insured
CDs and de jure uninsured debt differentiate among banks with
different degrees of risk. They make this assessment even though
partially insured depositors and even uninsured debt holders have had
good reason to believe that they would be bailed out by the deposit
insurance agencies. Aside from this evidence, there is no reason to
believe that bank creditors who were actually at risk would not behave
as do creditors generally, by demanding assurances and interest rates
that compensate them for expected losses.
Third, the well-expressed concerns about bank runs delineated by
Randall (1989) are considered and largely rejected. Indeed, if it were
accepted that bank runs could occur, it is likely that banks would hold
sufficient capital and organize their activities so as to assure depositors
that their funds were not at risk.
Nevertheless, the banking authorities appear to believe that runs on
large banks could be severely disruptive, as does Randall, despite
evidence and reasoning to the contrary. As Kane (1988, 1992) has
emphasized, and as is discussed above, the authorities have consider-
able incentives to avoid bank runs and few incentives to permit large
banks to fail, even though such failures probably would reduce future
costs to the FDIC and uninsured depositors. The experience of the
United States and many other countries indicates that depositors will
rarely be permitted to absorb losses from bank failures.13 Consequently,
despite my previous conclusion that uninsured depositors can be
effective monitors and controllers of bank risk, I suggest that we must
look to other sources of market discipline. The two remaining sources
are subordinated debt and equity capital.14
Subordinated Debt15
Subordinated debt should be considered fully as bank capital, as it
serves to absorb losses that would be imposed on the FDIC as much as
does equity capital. It differs from other debt in that it cannot be collater-
alized or redeemed, directly or indirectly, before the authorities can act to
13 See Benston (1994) for a review of this evidence.
14 Much of the material on subordinated debt and equity capital is taken from Benston
(1992).
15 See Benston and others (1986, Chapter 7, section IV) for a more complete
description and Osterberg and Thompson (1991) for a formal analysis and additional
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reorganize or close a bank. Hence, subordinated debt ought to have a
remaining maturity of at least two years, and the bank or its subsidiaries
should not be permitted to purchase it at any time. Because holders of
subordinated debt are not depositors and cannot expect to be reimbursed
by the FDIC, they should serve well as monitors over banks’ activities.
Subordinated debt has at least six important advantages over
deposits and equity capital. First, subordinated debt holders cannot run;
hence authorities should have no concern about the disruptive effects of
runs should they close a bank. Second, subordinated debt promises an
asymmetric payoff. Should a bank do well, debt holders collect only the
interest promised. Should a bank do badly, the debt holders will absorb
losses that exceed the equity holders’ investment. Third, the interest on
subordinated debt serves as a risk-adjusted deposit insurance premium,
because the debt holders stand to lose should a bank engage in risky
activities; hence, they will have to be reimbursed for this perceived ex
ante risk or they will not purchase the debentures.
Fourth, when subordinated debt is publicly traded, the authorities
are provided with an early warning signal in the form of the interest rate
demanded on the debt and any difficulty a bank has in replacing
maturing debt. Fifth, subordinated debt probably can be sold by closely
held banks at a lower cost than that of obtaining additional equity.
Owners of such banks may not want to invest more of their personal
wealth (thereby subjecting themselves to undiversified portfolios, par-
ticularly when they also work for these banks); outside investors rarely
are interested in being minority shareholders. Closely held banks and
banks with thinly traded securities can, however, sell subordinated
debentures to the public or to institutional investors such as pension
funds and other banks, which are capable of monitoring the banks’
activities. Sixth, interest on subordinated debt is a tax-deductible ex-
pense; hence, this debt is no more costly (with respect to taxes) to a bank
than are deposits. Indeed, subordinated debt differs from time deposits
only in that the debt is explicitly and implicitly not government-insured.
Note that should losses deplete or wipe out a bank’s equity capital,
subordinated debt holders become partial or full equity holders. To the
extent that they become equity holders, they have incentives to increase
the put option value of deposit insurance by increasing risks. Therefore,
unless the bank supervisors reorganize or close a bank before this
occurs, an important advantage of subordinated debt will be lost.
Equity Capital
Equity holders clearly have incentives to monitor bank perfor-
mance. However, they can benefit from a high degree of risk-taking
because they get all the returns from successful outcomes but absorb86 George J. Benston
losses only to the extent of their investments in the bank. In effect,
equity holders have a "put option" on the bank, with the exercise price
the amount owed to depositors. As noted above, the option usually has
value to bank equity owners because, unlike most other creditors, the
FDIC does not price its deposit insurance to account sufficiently for the
risks taken by banks.
The value of the "deposit-insurance put option" to a bank managed
to maximize the wealth of its owners increases with the variance of
returns and the time it takes the authorities to take over a failing bank.
As a bank’s capital declines towards zero, the value of this put option
increases because the equity holders have less to lose.16 Once the value
of the equity goes below the point where the option might be exercised,
equity holders have incentives to increase its value. They can do this by
increasing the riskiness of the bank’s investments and operations,
withdrawing funds from the bank, and delaying actions by the FDIC to
displace them. (They may be constrained, however, by their managers,
who are subject to severe civil monetary penalties and possible criminal
prosecution for operating the bank in an unsafe manner.)
The value of the deposit-insurance put option, and hence the
incentive for bank owners to increase risk as their economic capital
declines towards zero, can be reduced, if not entirely eliminated, by
higher capital requirements and a system of structured early interven-
tion and resolution.
Higher Capital Requirements and Structured
Early Intervention and Resolution
Structured early intervention and resolution was first proposed by
Benston and Kaufman (1988) and has been largely (if insufficiently)
adopted in FDICIA in 1991.17 A brief description should provide the key
elements of the system.18
Bank capital should include both equity and subordinated debt.
Capital should be measured in terms of the economic market values of
a bank’s assets and liabilities. However, the proposed scheme also can
be effective when capital is measured according to traditional accounting
16 See Merton (1977) for a formal analysis and Marcus and Shaked (1984), Ronn and
Verma (1986), and Pennacchi (1987) for applications.
17 The intellectual history of structured early intervention and resolution is described
in Benston and Kaufman (1993a, Chapter 1). A complete description of the system, an
analysis of its advantages and shortcomings, and a comparison with the system adopted
in FDICIA can be found in Benston and Kaufman (1993b).
18 The description is taken largely from Benston (1994) and is based on Benston and
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values, particularly when the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s
requirements for stating financial instruments at market values are fully
adopted. Four explicit, predetermined ranges or tranches of capital-to-
asset ratios are specified. Assets and liabilities include off-balance-sheet
accounts. Assets are not classified according to risk because of the
difficulties in measuring ex ante risk accurately.
(1) Banks are considered to have adequate capital when it is 10
percent or more of their total assets, measured in terms of
market or current values.19 Banks falling into this first tranche
would be subject to minimum regulation and supervision.
(2) Banks with capital-to-asset ratios of 6 to 9.9 percent are at the
first level of supervisory concern. A bank in this second tranche is
subject to increased regulatory supervision and more frequent
monitoring of its activities. It is required to submit a business
plan to raise more capital. At its discretion, the bank supervi-
sory authority could require the bank to suspend dividend
payments and to obtain approval before transferring funds
within a holding company system; the authority could also
restrict the growth of bank assets.
(3) The third tranche is the second level of supervisory concern; it is
reached when a bank’s capital ratio falls below 6 percent but is
at least 3 percent. Banks in this range are subject to intense
regulatory supervision and monitoring. The supervisory au-
thority is required to suspend dividends, interest payments on
subordinated debt, and unapproved outflows of funds to the
bank’s parent or affiliates. The institution must submit an
emergency plan for its immediate recapitalization to the tranche
one level.
(4) Finally, when a bank’s capital falls below 3 percent of its assets,
it is in tranche four--mandatory recapitalization and reorganization.
The supervisory authority is required to quickly recapitalize the
bank, merge it, or liquidate it in an orderly fashion by the sale of
individual assets. The present owners and subordinated debt
holders (who might, by then, be the owners) have the options of
implementing more quickly the emergency plan they submitted
when the institution moved into tranche three, or of electing not
to inject additional funds into the bank. If the owners and debt
holders elected not to recapitalize the bank, any residual value
from its sale or liquidation of its assets would be returned to
them, after allowing for costs incurred.
19 The percentages are suggestive; they should be based on research findings. If book
values are used, the percentages should be higher.88 George J. Benston
Conclusions
With a system of structured early intervention and resolution in
place, deposits could be fully (100 percent) insured. Even though
depositor runs do not pose a serious problem to the banking system or
the economy, but rather can be beneficial for motivating and rewarding
banks to operate prudently, a reason for 100 percent deposit insurance
remains. At present, very large banks are seen as being "too-big-to-
fail"--that is, to have costs imposed on depositors, should these banks
fail. As a result, smaller banks are disadvantaged, giving rise to an
inequity. Additional inequities are the imposition of deposit insurance
premiums on all domestic deposits, even though only the first $100,000
is explicitly insured, and the exemption from deposit insurance of
foreign-branch deposits, even though these deposits are de facto cov-
ered. These inequities could be eliminated with 100 percent explicit
deposit insurance coverage. Of course, such coverage removes deposi-
tors as monitors and market disciplinarians of banks. But, as described
above, the use of subordinated debt as part of capital, higher capital
requirements, and structured early intervention and resolution would
impose a more effective means of market discipline. It also would
eliminate almost entirely the need for deposit insurance premiums and,
for adequately capitalized banks, it would provide relief from close
supervision by the banking authorities and from almost all current
restrictions on assets and on banking activities.MARKET DISCIPLINE: THE ROLE OF UNINSURED DEPOSITORS 89
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MARKET FOR BANK EQUITY
Share prices of bank
stocks estimated as a
function of (1) capital ra-
tios, (2) earnings and
growth of earnings, (3) as-
set size, and (4) loss rates.
Betas for individual banks
(a measure of risk derived
from stock prices) esti-
mated as a function of the
capital ratios of individual
banks.
Pettway (1980) For several large banks
that failed, returns to
shareholders are simu-
lated for several years
prior to their failure. Simu-
lations are based on re-
turns from holding stocks
of large banks that did not
fail.
Brewer and Betas for individual banks
Lee (1986) are estimated as functions
of ratios from balance
sheets and income state-
ments used by bank su-
pervisors to reflect risk.
Cornell and Returns to shareholders of
Shapiro (1986) 43 large banks are esti-
mated as functions of the
composition of their as-
sets and liabilities in the
years 1982-83.
Holding constant the influ-
ence of earnings, banks
with higher capital ratios
and lower loss rates tend to
have higher share prices.
The coefficient on the cap-
ital ratio is negative for one
year but insignificant for
other years. The negative
coefficient on the capital ra-
tio indicates that investors
consider banks with higher
capital ratios to be less
risky.
On average, returns on the
stocks of banks that failed
declined relative’ to simu-
lated returns two years be-
fore failure.
Some of the measures cho-
sen to reflect risk have pos-
itive, significant regression
coefficients.
The percentage that Latin
American loans was of total
assets had a significant,
negative impact on returns
in 1982. Energy loans had
a negative impact in 1982-
83. Loans purchased from
Penn Square Bank had a
negative impact on returns
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Implications of Empirical Studies for the Effectiveness of Market Discipline
of Bank Risk












Prices of bank stocks are
estimated as a function of
its earnings and capital
ratios.
Changes in stock prices of
large banks at the time
of the announcement by
Mexico in 1982 of its mor-
atorium on debt payments
as a function of the ratio
of Mexican debt to equity
capital at individual banks.
Returns on holding the
stock of BHCs estimated
as a function of the change
in the market value of
the BHCs’ loans to less-
developed countries and
dummy variables for indi-
vidual banks and individual
time periods.
This is a case study of 40
BHCs that reported rela-
tively large losses in the
1980s. For each BHC, a
time period is designated
when it began assuming
relatively high risk and a
time period when problems
became public knowledge.
Stock prices are compared
to market averages before
and after the problems be-
came public knowledge.
EQUITY continued
The coefficient on the cap-
ital ratio is positive and sig-
nificant for some years, in-
significant for other years.
Coefficient on the ratio of
Mexican debt to equity
capital is negative and sig-
nificant. Banks were not re-
quired to disclose their
Mexican debt at the time of
the 1982 moratorium.
The change in the market
value of loans to less-de-
veloped countries has a
positive, significant coeffi-
cient which is not signifi-
cantly different from unity.
Stock prices of the BHCs
that reported relatively
large losses declined rela-
tive to market average
stock prices only after the
problems became public
knowledge, not during the
periods in which the banks
began assuming relatively
high risk.
MARKET FOR UNINSURED DEPOSITS
The interest rate on large denomination certificates of
deposit is the dependent variable in each study.
Identifies the determinants The factor that reflects profit
of the CD rate using factor rates and capital ratios is not
analysis, a significant variable in ex-
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Estimates CD rates as a
function of variables used
by bank supervisors to re-
flect risk.
CD rate estimated as a
function of variables used
by bank supervisors to re-
flect risk, and separately,
as functions of level and
variability of the prices of
bank stocks.
The average interest rates
paid by 58 large banks on
their large denomination
deposits are estimated as
functions of leverage, loan
loss provision divided by
total loans and the vari-
ance of stock returns.
Results
Of bank risk variables, only
the liquidity measure has a
significant coefficient. Cap-
ital and loss ratios have in-
significant coefficients.
Coefficients on risk mea-
sures used by bank super-
visors are not significant.
Measures of the level and
variability of stock prices
help explain CD rates.
Each of these measures of












CD rate is estimated as a
function of (1) the variabil-
ity of the ratio of income to
assets, (2) the capital ratio
and (3) bank assets.
These three variables have
significant coefficients. CD
rates tend to be higher at
banks with more variable
income and lower capital
ratios, holding constant the
influence of total assets.
Yes
James (1989) Interest cost on large CDs
estimated as a function of
risk measures: domestic
loans/capital, foreign loans/
capital and the loan loss
provision/total loans.
Interest cost positively re-
lated to the ratio of domes-
tic loans to capital and the
loan loss provision. The
negative relation between
interest cost and the ratio
of foreign loans to capital
is interpreted as evidence
of an implicit government
guarantee of foreign loans.
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MARKET FOR SUBORDINATED DEBT:
In each study the measure of the interest rate on the
subordinated debt of banks is the rate on the subordinated
debt minus the rate on long-term U.S. Treasury securities,
called the rate premium.
The rate premium is esti- The coefficient on the cap-
mated as a function of ital ratio is not significant,
the capital ratio of banks
and other independent
variables.
The rate premium is esti-
mated as a function of
several measures of risk,
including a loss ratio and
a leverage ratio.
The rate premium is esti-
mated as a function of the
capital ratio and the vari-
ability of profits divided by
total assets.
The coefficients on the loss
and leverage ratios are
positive and significant.
Neither independent vari-
able has a significant coef-
ficient.
The rate premium is esti-
mated as a function of
several measures of risk
assumed by banks.
The rate premium is esti-
mated as a function of risk
measures derived from
balance sheets and in-
come statements and of
the asset size of banks.
Use data in Avery, Belton
and Goldberg (1988) to
derive a measure of the
variance of assets of
banks implied by a contin-
gent claims valuation
model. The measure of the
variance of assets is esti-
mated as a function of the
risk measures derived
from balance sheets and
income statements.
None of the risk measures
have significant coefficients.
Coefficients on the risk
measures derived from bal-
ance sheets and income
statements are not signifi-
cant.
Some of the risk measures
derived from the balance
sheets and income state-
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